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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew Lee Hurst appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction for 
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and order relinquishing jurisdiction following 
the denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Hurst asserts that the district court erred when 
it denied his motion to suppress. Furthermore, Mr. Hurst asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction, and executing a unified sentence of 
thirty years, with four years fixed, and by denying his Motion for Reconsideration of 
Sentence and for Leave made pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35 
motion). The argument advanced by Mr. Hurst on his motion to suppress raises what 
appears to be an issue of first impression in Idaho. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case arose when Mr. Hurst's seven year old step-daughter reported to her 
mother that Mr. Hurst had attempted to have vaginal and anal intercourse with her. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p. 2.) That day, Detective Stoffele 
of the Ada County Sheriff's Office went to Mr. Hurst's place of employment, a Wells 
Fargo call center in Boise. (Tr.6/22/09, p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.4.) Upon arrival, Detective 
Stoffele went to the reception area where he spoke with a security guard, and 
"explained to them who I wanted to visit with, and so they somehow contacted him, or 
[a] supervisor or something, but had him brought or sent down to the lobby." 
(Tr.6/22/09, p.9, L.22 - p.1 0, L.2.) 
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Mr. Hurst went to the lobby, and ended up with Detective Stoffele in the "foyer-
type area between [the] inside door and a complete exterior door." (Tr.6/22/09, p.10, 
L.18 - p.11, L.6.) During the encounter, Detective Stoffele was wearing "plain clothes" 
with a badge around his neck and a gun. (Tr. 6/22/09 , p.11, Ls.17-25.) Detective 
Stoffele could not recall whether the gun was visible. (Tr.6/22/09, p.17, Ls.13-15.) 
Detective Stoffele had previously arranged to have a Boise City marked patrol car 
parked near the business, which was visible from where Detective Stoffele spoke with 
Mr. Hurst. (Tr.6/22/09, p.12, Ls.8-23.) Detective Stoffele was not able to recall 
whether, at the time he noticed the police car, it was while he was with Mr. Hurst in the 
foyer-type area. Although it was visible, Detective Stoffele did not "believe" that the 
police car was obvious from the lobby. (Tr.6/22/09, p.12, L.19 - p.13, L.4.) 
The district court made the following findings of fact with respect to the events 
immediately preceding and following the arrest of Mr. Hurst1: 
At the time of the initial contact, Defendant was not in custody. The 
detective explained that he wanted Defendant to come down to the 
sheriff's office to talk about some things that had been transpiring with 
Defendant's step-daughter. Defendant said he was going to get his 
attorney which the detective said was fine. In discussing the matter 
further, the detective indicated he did not want to talk to Defendant at his 
work place and that he wanted him to come to the sheriff's office so they 
wouldn't be interrupted and added this was not something he could "push 
off to the side and let go." The detective added that he was willing to 
provide transportation for Defendant since he knew Defendant did not own 
a car, but it was going "to have to happen now." At that point, Defendant 
asked if he was being arrested and the detective replied he was inviting 
Defendant to come talk to him and would appreciate it if he did so. 
Defendant asked how to go about contacting an attorney and the detective 
explained they would discuss all of that at the sheriff's office. The 
detective then asked Defendant if he was willing to come down to the 
sheriff's office and talk to him. Defendant responded he needed to make 
1 Detective Stoffele recorded his interaction with Mr. Hurst; the district court's findings of 
fact are based, in part, on a review of that audio recording. (R., p.40.) 
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sure he had representation. The detective again asked if Defendant was 
willing to come down and talk to him at which point Defendant said "not 
without a lawyer." At that time, Detective Stoffle [sic] placed Defendant 
under arrest. 
Defendant was taken to the Ada County Jail for interrogation. Before 
being questioned, he was read his Miranda rights, signed the advice of 
rights form, and agreed to talk to the detective. 
(R., pp.40-41.) Additionally, the district court found that the interaction prior to 
Mr. Hurst's arrest "was little more than four minutes long and primarily concerned 
the detective's request that Defendant come down to the sheriff's office and talk 
to him." (R., p.42.) 
Defense counsel raised three issues during argument on the suppression motion. 
First, defense counsel argued that Mr. Hurst was effectively in custody at the time that 
he invoked his right to counsel. (Tr.6/22/09, p.21, Ls.5-18.) Second, defense counsel 
argued that Mr. Hurst's statements regarding counsel represented an unequivocal 
assertion of the right to counsel. (Tr.6/22/09, p.23, Ls.18-21.) Third, defense counsel 
argued that, by waiving his Miranda rights, Mr. Hurst did not reinitiate conversation with 
the detective. (Tr.6/22/09, p.24, Ls.15-22.) 
The district court reasoned that "in order to suppress his confession and the 
other evidence pursuant to Miranda, Defendant must establish that 1) he was in custody 
at the time of the meeting with Detective Stoffle [sic] at Wells Fargo Insurance Services 
and 2) he was being subjected to interrogation at that time." (R., pp.41-42.) In finding 
no Miranda violation, the district court focused on the fact that defense counsel 
conceded that the interaction at Wells Fargo was not an interrogation, and its own 
finding that Mr. Hurst was not in custody at the time that he made statements regarding 
counsel. Analogizing the encounter with Edwards v. Arizona, 452 U.S. 477 (1981), the 
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district court concluded that "there can be no infringement of the Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel where Defendant was not in custody." (R., p.43.) 
The district court found, "Defendant was not under arrest until the conclusion of 
the meeting and the detective said nothing that would lead Defendant to believe he was 
under arrest prior to that, nor did the detective tell Defendant he couldn't leave." 
(R., p.42.) 
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Hurst entered a conditional 
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress in 
exchange for which the State agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen and recommend a unified life sentence, with fifteen 
years fixed. (Tr.7/9/09, p.40, L.17 - p.41, L.5.) The State ultimately recommended that 
the district court impose a unified life sentence, with five years fixed, based on Mr. Hurst 
being assessed as amenable to treatment and a low risk to reoffend with such 
treatment. (Tr.8/21/09, p.64, L.21 - p.65, L.6.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of thirty years, with five years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (Tr.8/21/09, p.83, 
Ls.1-11.) Following the rider, the district court reduced the fixed portion of Mr. Hurst's 
sentence from five years to four because he "did everything he could on his rider." 
(Tr.2/12/10, p.11, L.1 - p.12, L.21.) Mr. Hurst filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Reducing Sentence. (R., p.67.) Mr. Hurst then 
filed a timely Rule 35 motion, which was denied without a hearing on the basis that it 
constituted a "subsequent" Rule 35 motion.2 
2 See the Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave and the Order Denying 
Rule 35 Motion attached to the Motion to Augment filed concurrently with this brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hurst's motion to suppress because 
his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and 
executed a unified sentence of thirty years, with four years fixed, following 
Mr. Hurst's period of retained jurisdiction? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hurst's Rule 35 
motion on the basis that it was a "subsequent" motion? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hurst's Rule 35 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hurst's Motion To Suppress Because His 
Statements Were Obtained In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment To The U.S. 
Constitution 
Mr. Hurst asserts that the district court erred in its application of constitutional 
principles when it denied his motion to suppress because his statements were obtained 
in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the district 
court erred when it found that Mr. Hurst could not have - and had not - invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel because he was neither being interrogated nor in custody 
when he made the invocation. Although Mr. Hurst maintains that a person need not be 
in custody at the time of his invocation of the right to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment if such an invocation is made contemporaneous to the arrest, he also 
asserts that the district court erred in finding that he was not subjected to the functional 
equivalent of custody at the time that he invoked his right to counsel. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court defers to the trial court's 
findings of fact if they were supported by substantial evidence, but will freely review the 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. See State v. Atkinson, 128 
Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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A. Mr. Hurst's Invocation Of His Right To Counsel Was Unequivocal 
As a threshold issue, Mr. Hurst asserts that his request for counsel was an 
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. 3 "Invocation of the Miranda right to 
counsel 'requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to 
be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.'" Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 
(quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991». In order to claim the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect "must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davis, 
512 U.S. at 459. When a person invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the 
police must "scrupulously honor" that request. See State v. Brennan, 123 Idaho 553, 
555, 850 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Mr. Hurst made multiple statements in which he requested an attorney, including 
stating that (1) "he was going to get his attorney[,]" (2) asking how he could "go about 
contacting an attorney[,]" (3) wanting to "make sure he had representation[,]" and, (4) 
when asked if he would go to the station to talk, stating, "[N]ot without a lawyer." 
(R., pp.40-41.) Any reasonable police officer would have understood that, at least with 
respect to the first, third, and fourth statements,4 Mr. Hurst was unequivocally invoking 
the right to counsel. 
3 Mr. Hurst raises this issue first because, if the request for counsel was not 
unequivocal, then no constitutional violation could have occurred. See State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 559, 199 P.3d 123, 134 (2008) (citing Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452 
i1994). 
Arguably, asking how to go about contacting an attorney is not a clear and 
unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel. 
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B. Whether Mr. Hurst's Invocation Was Made Before His Arrest Is Irrelevant To 
Whether His Invocation Was Valid 
Mr. Hurst asserts that whether his invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel was made before his arrest is irrelevant to whether his invocation was valid. 
The district court erroneously concluded that, in order to invoke the right to counsel 
under Miranda,5 Mr. Hurst needed, at the time of the invocation, to have been in 
custody or subjected to interrogation. (R., p.43.) Mr. Hurst asserts that, assuming 
arguendo that he was not in custody at the time of the invocation, it was not necessary 
because he contends that whether an invocation is pre- or post-arrest, it is still a valid 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Additionally, Mr. Hurst asserts that 
when such an invocation is made contemporaneous with an arrest, due process and 
fundamental fairness require that such an invocation be honored. These appear to be 
issues of first impression, at least in Idaho. 
1. Whether An Invocation Of The Fifth Amendment Right To Counsel Is 
Made Pre- Or Post-Arrest Is Irrelevant 
Mr. Hurst asserts that whether an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel is made pre- or post-arrest is irrelevant. The best sources with which to 
analyze the issue of whether a pre-arrest invocation of the right to counsel is valid 
5 In its written decision, the district court consistently classified Mr. Hurst's issue as one 
involving Miranda rights, while defense counsel clearly articulated an argument, deftly 
summarized by the district court at the hearing, that "in a custodial setting, even if there 
is no interrogation, even if there is no requirement that Miranda rights be given, if the 
defendant invokes the right to counsel, again, equivocal or not, invokes the right to 
counsel, then at that point, because of the right to counsel, and not necessarily because 
of Miranda, nothing further can be initiated in terms of interrogation until either counsel 
is provided or the defendant voluntarily or [sic] reinitiates the contact with the police." 
(Tr.6/22/09, p.36, Ls.6-16.) 
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appear to be those addressing the substantive use, in the State's case-in-chief, of either 
pre-arrest silence or the pre-arrest invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to an 
attorney or to remain silent. 
Among the federal circuit courts, there is a split as to whether pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda silence is admissible at trial in the government's case-in-chief. Vermont v. 
Kulzer, 979 A.2d 1031, 1035-36 (Vt. 2009). The state appellate courts are also divided, 
although "[a] significant number have ruled, on either state or federal constitutional 
grounds, that the state may not introduce such silence during its case in chief." Kulzer, 
979 A.2d at 1036. The Kulzer Court noted that Idaho is one jurisdiction that has held 
that the "Fifth Amendment prohibits [the] prosecution from introducing, in its case in 
chief, and for the sole purpose of implying guilt, evidence of a defendant's failure to 
appear at [a] scheduled police interview." 979 A.2d at 1036 (citing State v. Moore, 131 
Idaho 814, 820-21, 965 P.2d 174, 180-81 (1998». The Kulzer Court also cited to an 
opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in which that court held "that a proper 
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is protected [by the Fifth 
Amendment] from prosecutorial comment or substantive use, no matter whether such 
invocation occurs before or after a defendant's arrest." Kulzer, 979 A.2d at 1036 
(quoting State v. Boston, 663 S.E.2d 886, 896 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008». 
The Ohio Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that the use of pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda invocations of the right to silence and the right to counsel in the government's 
case-in-chief violate the Fifth Amendment. State v. Leach, 807 N.E.2d 335 (Ohio 2004). 
At trial in Leach the government elicited testimony from the investigating officer that 
Leach had originally agreed to meet with the police regarding their investigation, but 
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later failed to show-up, instead leaving a message on the officer's answering machine 
that "he wanted to speak to an attorney before talking with the police." 807 N.E.2d at 
337. 
In assessing the values protected by the Fifth Amendment, the Leach decision 
included the following passage from Murphy v. Waterfront Comm. of New York Harbor, 
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964): 
[The Fifth Amendment] reflects many of our fundamental values ... 
[including] our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual 
balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until 
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government 
in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load;" our respect for 
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 
"to a private enclave where he may lead a private life;" our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while 
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent." 
807 N.E.2d at 341. 
The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately held, "Allowing the use of pre-arrest silence, 
evidenced here by the pre-arrest invocation of the right to counsel, as substantive 
evidence of guilt in the state's case-in-chief undermines the very protections the Fifth 
Amendment was designed to provide." Leach, 807 N.E.2d at 341. 
Although the cases cited above dealt specifically with the pre-arrest invocation of 
the right to silence and counsel, rather than statements obtained after such invocations, 
considering the constitutional principles on which the decisions rest, Mr. Hurst asserts 
that this Court should follow their reasoning to its logical conclusion, and hold that 
whether an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is made pre- or post-
arrest is irrelevant, and that any such invocation must be scrupulously honored by the 
government and its agents. 
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2. When An Invocation Of The Fifth Amendment Right To Counsel Is Made 
Contemporaneously With An Arrest, Due Process And Fundamental 
Fairness Require That Such An Invocation Be Scrupulously Honored 
Mr. Hurst asserts that when an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel is made contemporaneously with an arrest, due process and fundamental 
fairness require that such an invocation be scrupulously honored. In criminal 
prosecutions, one-sided procedural laws that benefit the government violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 
(1973). Mr. Hurst asserts that, under a logical extension of the reasoning set forth in 
Wardius, there is no legitimate reason why one-sided substantive law that benefits the 
government in criminal prosecutions should be treated any differently. 
In Wardius, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon statute that required 
a criminal defendant to provide written notice of an alibi defense, including the names 
and contact information of witnesses, prior to trial, but "made no provision for reciprocal 
discovery [from the government)." 412 U.S. at 471-72. The Court noted that the Due 
Process Clause "speak[s] to the balance of forces between the accused and his 
accuser." Id., 412 U.S. at 474. As a result, the Court noted that it "has therefore been 
particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the 
State when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a fair 
triaL" Id., 412 U.S. at 474 n. 6. The Court held, "It is fundamentally unfair to require a 
defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him 
to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he 
disclosed to the State." Id., 412 U.S. at 475-76. 
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With the principles set forth in Wardius in mind, Mr. Hurst asserts that the 
substantive law that benefits the State that is most similar to the issue he raises is the 
law governing searches incident to arrest. With respect to the timing of a search 
incident to arrest, a recognized exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth 
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court has held, "Where the formal arrest followed 
quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it 
particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa." 
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980). The Idaho appellate courts have 
likewise held that "[s]o long as the search and arrest are substantially 
contemporaneous, and the fruits of the search are not required to establish probable 
cause for the arrest, the search need not precisely follow the arrest in order to be 
incident to that arrest." State v. Chapman, 146 Idaho 346, 351, 194 P.3d 550, 555 
(2008) (citing State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct. App. 
2002)). 
Even if Mr. Hurst's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not 
made while he was in custody or its functional equivalent,6 it was at the very least made 
"substantially contemporaneous" to the arrest. Mr. Hurst asserts that the timing of an 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel should be given treatment consistent 
with that of searches incident to arrest, as both involve constitutional issues, both 
involve the significance of the timing of actions associated with arrest, and due process 
and fundamental fairness require placing criminal defendants on at least equal footing 
with the State. Considering the principles set forth in Wardius, it would be a violation of 
6 A detailed discussion of this issue is in subsection 3 below. 
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due process and fundamentally unfair to allow the State to use one interpretation of the 
timing of arrests to benefit under one constitutional provision, while denying a criminal 
defendant a similarly beneficial interpretation under another constitutional provision. 
C. Mr. Hurst Was In Custody, Or Its Functional Equivalent, When He Invoked His 
Fifth Amendment Right To Counsel 
Mr. Hurst asserts that, at the time that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel he was in custody or its functional equivalent. As such, Mr. Hurst's motion to 
suppress all statements and derivative evidence following his invocation should have 
been granted by the district court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "Even though a person is not formally 
arrested, 'the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a 
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.'" 
State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,128-29,233 P.3d 52, 59-60 (2010) (internal punctuation 
omitted) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). "The 'custody' test 
is an objective one; it is not based on the subjective impressions in the minds of either 
the defendant or the law enforcement officer." State v. Massee, 132 Idaho 163, 165, 
968 P.2d 258, 260 (Ct. App. 1998). "[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable 
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. 
at 442. 
In rejecting a defendant's claim that a regularly scheduled meeting with a 
probation officer was akin to being in custody, the U.S. Supreme Court made the 
following observations: 
Custodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no 
choice but to submit to the officers' will and to confess. It is unlikely that a 
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probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient 
time, would give rise to a similar impression. Moreover, custodial arrest 
thrusts an individual into "an unfamiliar atmosphere" or "an interrogation 
environment ... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the 
individual to the will of his examiner." Many of the psychological ploys 
discussed in Miranda capitalize on the suspect's unfamiliarity with the 
officers and the environment. Murphy's regular meetings with his 
probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her 
office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might 
overbear his desire to claim the privilege. Finally, the coercion inherent in 
custodial interrogation derives in large measure from an interrogator's 
insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is 
obtained. Since Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left 
the office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that 
terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not 
comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he 
literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator. 
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984) (emphases added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Examining the factors considered in Murphy, it is apparent that Mr. Hurst's 
encounter can be classified as being one involving custody or its functional equivalent. 
Over the course of four minutes, Detective Stoffele, who was wearing a badge, armed 
with a firearm, and within sight of a marked police cruiser, requested at least five times 
that Mr. Hurst accompany him to the station to answer questions. (R., pp.40-41.) 
During that same four minutes, Detective Stoffele told Mr. Hurst that the reason he 
wanted to take him to the station was "so they wouldn't be interrupted," that the 
interview "was not something he could 'push off to the side and let goL],,' and that the 
interview was "going 'to have to happen now. III (R., p.41.) Given these facts, it is hard 
to imagine that any objectively reasonable person would have felt anything but a 
compulsion to submit to the will of the detective. The facts of Mr. Hurst's case represent 
exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court described in Murphy when it wrote, "[T]he 
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coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure from an 
interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is 
obtained." 465 U.S. at 433. 
Several additional facts support a finding that any reasonable person in 
Mr. Hurst's position would have felt he was in the functional equivalent of custody at the 
time that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Detective Stoffele's 
encounter with Mr. Hurst began by having Mr. Hurst summoned to the lobby of his 
workplace by a security guard and, quite possibly, his supervisor. (Tr.6/22/09, p.9, L.22 
- p.10, L.2.) Detective Stoffele also indicated that he knew intimate details about 
Mr. Hurst, namely that he did not own a car, and would need a ride to the station. 
(R., p.41.) Finally, Detective Stoffele responded to one of Mr. Hurst's several requests 
to contact an attorney by stating that "they would discuss all of that [contacting an 
attorney] at the sheriff's office[,]" and responding to his request that "he needed to make 
sure he had representation" by "again" asking Mr. Hurst to go to the station to be 
interviewed. (R., p.41.) None of this behavior is consistent with the principles set forth 
in the Fifth Amendment. 
Mr. Hurst asserts that he was in the functional equivalent of custody when he 
unequivocally invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. By failing to scrupulously 
honor that invocation, the State was able to obtain unconstitutionally-coerced 
inculpatory statements and derivative evidence.7 Therefore, the district court erred in 
7 The derivative evidence that Mr. Hurst sought to suppress is listed in his Amended 
Motion to Suppress. (R., p.34.) That evidence consists of "a semen sample on the 
rug," which the police learned about directly as a result of the post-invocation 
interrogation of Mr. Hurst, as well as any incriminating evidence discovered during a 
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denying Mr. Hurst's motion to suppress. This Court should reverse the district court's 
order denying Mr. Hurst's motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with its decision. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
Considering Mr. Hurst's excellent performance during his rider, the probation 
recommendation made by the North Idaho Correctional Institution (hereinafter, NICI) 
staff, and other positive and mitigating factors set forth below, Mr. Hurst asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and let stand a unified 
sentence of thirty years, with four years fixed. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
A district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001). 
Such a decision will not be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial court has 
sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate." State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). "The 
purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court 
additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for 
search of Mr. Hurst's laptop computer, a search to which he consented during the post-
invocation interrogation. (R., p.34.) 
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probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203,205,786 P.2d 594, 596 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193,687 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1984». 
"Good performance at NICI, though commendable, does not alone create an 
abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to place the defendant on 
probation or reduce the sentence." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137, 30 P.3d at 292 
(emphasis added). Rather, the district court "considers all of the circumstances to 
assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to 
determine the course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection 
of society, deterrence, and retribution." Id. 
In concluding that a district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction was not an 
abuse of discretion, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that factors supporting such a 
decision included a defendant's failure to complete a recommended treatment program 
while at NICI, refusal to accept responsibility for committing the underlying crime, 
attempts to blame others, and a "tendency to rationalize and be dishonest." State v. 
Langford, 136 Idaho 334, 340,33 P.3d 567,573 (Ct. App. 2001). 
None of the factors supporting a relinquishment of jurisdiction discussed in 
Langford are present in Mr. Hurst's case. First, Mr. Hurst completed all individual 
programs he was assigned, including Personal Finance 1 and 2, Career Planning, 
Preparation for Probation, Computer Literacy, and the Sex-Offender Assessment 
Group. (NICI Addendum to PSI (hereinafter, NICI Report), p.2.) Mr. Hurst did more 
than just complete his programs, he excelled at them, as evidenced by reports of his 
participation that include statements that he was "enthusiastic, participated in all class 
discussions, and turned in all required assignments[,]" and, under the individual 
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accountability model, by advancing to Level 3, "the highest obtainable level of 
advancement at NICI." (NICI Report, pp.2-3.) Most importantly, considering the nature 
of the offense, was his excellent progress in the Sex-Offender Assessment Group, 
which was summarized as follows: 
Mr. Hurst was very conscientious about having his homework 
assignments reviewed by his peers in the unit prior to presenting them to 
the group. He was eager to receive feedback and listened carefully to the 
feedback offered. He made changes that he thought were appropriate 
and then presented the assignment to the group. Because of this extra 
effort, Mr. Hurst passed off more of his assignments than the average 
group participant did. Mr. Hurst listened attentively to group members' 
presentations and gave thoughtful feedback to them. His peers reported 
that Mr. Hurst was very helpful to them in the unit. He was always willing 
to help others understand the assignments and to give them feedback if 
they asked for it. Mr. Hurst has gained empathy for his victim and insight 
into his risk factors, triggers, and red flags. 
(NICI Report, p.3.) 
Second, unlike the defendant in Langford, Mr. Hurst accepted responsibility for 
the underlying crime and related unlawful conduct. During a sex offender risk 
assessment while on his rider, Mr. Hurst admitted that he "raped" the victim several 
times during the period of time surrounding the crime for which he pled guilty. (Sex 
Offender Risk Assessment (1/5/10), appended to NICI Report, p.[2].8) Additional 
evidence of Mr. Hurst's acceptance of responsibility include the fact that he waived his 
preliminary hearing and pleaded guilty, thus sparing the victim the trauma of testifying in 
open court. (R., p.20; Tr. 7/9/09 , p.52, Ls.22-25.) 
Third, Mr. Hurst did not blame others for his wrongdoing, notably writing in the 
PSI Questionnaire, "[T]here is no excuess [sic] for my actions. I did not think of anyone 
8 The assessment is not paginated; appellate counsel has paginated it for ease of 
reference. 
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[sic] else but my self [sic] ... I was so wrong in what I did in the pain I have caused by 
my own selfishness." (PSI, p.4.) Finally, as indicated by his acceptance of 
responsibility and unwillingness to blame others, and unlike the defendant in Langford, 
Mr. Hurst did not attempt to rationalize or be dishonest during his rider. 
Perhaps most important in determining whether the district court abused its 
discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction is the fact that the NICI staff recommended that 
the district court place Mr. Hurst on probation. (NICI Report, p.4.) This conclusion was 
based on Mr. Hurst's demonstrated ability to follow the rules, completion of "all his 
assigned programs[,]" and his having made "some positive changes in thinking and self-
awareness." (NICI Report, p.4.) In Statton, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the 
recommendation of the NICI staff as one factor in support of the district court's decision 
to relinquish jurisdiction. Statton, 136 Idaho at 137, 30 P.3d at 292. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hurst's Rule 35 Motion On 
The Basis That It Was A "Subsequent" Motion 
In addition to serving as a means of seeking remedy from a sentence that a 
defendant believes was unduly harsh, a Rule 35 motion can also serve as a means to 
request reconsideration of a decision to relinquish jurisdiction. See State v. Goodlett, 
139 Idaho 262, 265, 77 P.3d 487, 490 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Knutsen, 138 
Idaho 918, 71 P.3d 1065 (Ct. App. 2003». 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35), in relevant part, provides: 
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the filing of a 
judgment of conviction or within 120 days after the court releases retained 
jurisdiction. '" Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must 
be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or 
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order releasing retained jurisdiction and shall be considered by the court 
without the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument 
unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion; provided, however 
that no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of 
sentence under this Rule. 
(emphases added.) 
Mr. Hurst asserts that the district court misinterpreted the meaning of Rule 35 
when it denied his Rule 35 motion based on its erroneous conclusion that the motion 
was a "subsequent" motion under Rule 35 over which the court had no jurisdiction. 
(Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, p.[2t) The standard of review of a district court's 
decision that involves the interpretation of a criminal rule is free review. See State v. 
Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 175, 177 P.3d 387,389 (2008) (citing State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 
89,90 P.3d 314 (2004) and State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631,931 P.2d 625 (1997). 
At the hearing at which the district court relinquished jurisdiction, Mr. Hurst's trial 
counsel said, "I would like you to consider exercising your abilities under Rule 35" and 
asked the court to "consider dramatically cutting down on that fixed time." (Tr.2/12/10, 
p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.1.) In its order denying Mr. Hurst's written Rule 35 motion, the district 
court, citing State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 929 P.2d 744 (Ct. App. 1996), concluded, 
"In light of Defendant's oral Rule 35 motion at the time of his rider review hearing, this 
Court is without authority to consider his subsequent written Rule 35 motion filed on 
May 10, 2010." (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, p.[2].) 
Mr. Hurst asserts that his attorney's reference to the district court's inherent 
authority, under Rule 35, to reduce a sentence sua sponte was not a Rule 35 motion 
filed by Mr. Hurst, and that, to the extent that his argument conflicts with Heyrend, that it 
9 The Order is not paginated; appellate counsel has paginated it for ease of reference. 
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was wrongly decided. Mr. Hurst asserts that because what the district court classified 
as an "oral Rule 35 motion" was not "filed" as provided for in the plain language of Rule 
35, it was not a "filed" Rule 35 motion, but merely a request that the district court 
exercise its inherent authority. This issue does not appear to have been considered in 
Heyrend. 
Although Rule 35 is not a "statute" in the traditional sense, Mr. Hurst asserts that 
it should be interpreted in light of maxims of statutory construction. With that in mind, 
Mr. Hurst asserts that, in concluding that his attorney's reference to Rule 35 made at the 
rider review hearing was a Rule 35 motion, the district court violated several maxims of 
statutory construction because it ignored the word "filed." 
The first maxim of statutory construction that the district court violated was that 
"[j]udicial interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the statute's literal 
words." State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Obviously, when a court disregards one of the words contained in a statute, it has not 
examined the statute's literal words. 
The second maxim of statutory construction that the district court violated was 
that "[t]he language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). By 
removing or ignoring the word "filed" contained in Rule 35 in interpreting the rule's 
meaning, the district court failed to give the words of the statute their "plain, obvious, 
and rational meaning." 
Finally, in treating the word "filed" as mere surplusage, the district court violated a 
third maxim of statutory construction. See Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798 
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P.2d 27, 31 (1990) ("The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which 
makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein.") (citing Hartley v. Miller-
Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984), overruled on other grounds by Archer v. 
Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 786 P.2d 557 (1990». It was error to treat the 
word "filed" as mere surplusage, and that error led to the district court's conclusion that 
Mr. Hurst's written Rule 35 motion was a "subsequent" motion. 
Applying these maxims of statutory construction, it is clear that when the word 
"filed" is considered as part of Rule 35 that what the district court classified as an "oral 
Rule 35 motion" was not a "filed" Rule 35 motion. As such, the district court should 
have made a substantive ruling on Mr. Hurst's written Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hurst respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress. In 
the alternative, Mr. Hurst requests that this Court reduce both the fixed and 
indeterminate portions of his sentence as it deems appropriate, or vacate the order 
denying his Rule 35 motion, and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 15th day of September, 2010. 
CERJ.HAHN 
.........,~,y State Appellate Public Defender 
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